Those of us who are old enough to remember learning history in a Soviet classroom, most probably remember learning about the “Bloody Sunday”, the massacre of protesters in St.Petersburg, which sparked the 1^st Russian revolution of 1905-1907. I am sure I was not the only one who, after March 1 and subsequent events, had a feeling that history keeps repeating itself. So, tragically, Armenians have a date in their history, which matches the significance of the Bloody Sunday. Does it mean we also had a revolution?

 The word “revolution” was quite often used in Armenia during these months, actually much more frequently by the government supporters, who tried to equate the Armenian events with the so called “Colored revolutions”, a phenomenon, which had been largely demonized by the governing regimes in the post-Soviet space. The opposition itself, though it did not share, the government supporters’ negative view of “colored revolutions”, was somewhat reluctant to use the term, to avoid the accusations of “destabilizing the country”. After the March events, many observers, some sympathetic to opposition, but mostly those who disapprove of its actions, have argued that this was a failed attempt of revolution. May be that’s true. May be not exactly true.

The common understanding of the word “revolution” is “change of power” through violent means. The “velvet” revolutions showed that the change of power might happen through non-violent protests. But is this really what revolution is about? No, revolution is not when some people who have governed for some time are thrown out and simply replaced by new ones.  If the faces change, but the political system stays the same, this is not a revolution. A revolution is a dramatic change of the political system. Most often this is accompanied by a rotation of the government, but not necessarily. Take the Russian revolution of 1905-1907. Throughout the whole revolution tzar Nicholas II remained in power. But the political system changed: from an absolutist autocratic monarchy Russia turned into a parliamentary constitutional monarchy. The country went through dramatic changes in its political system, though there was no change of government (of course there were changes in the cabinet, but the supreme leader was the same person, and the political elite, from which the government members were recruited retained its positions). Eventually, this course of events was overturned by the reaction in 1907, which tried to go back to the old ways, as we know, not so successfully.

So, if we look from this perspective at the “colored” revolutions, we might see that some of them were not exactly revolutions in this sense. There had been constitutional changes in most cases, after the revolutions, but can we say that the political system changed dramatically? Let’s look at the first and most glorious example of “colored revolutions” – Georgia. Did the Rose revolution replace an authoritarian political system with a more democratic one? Some say yes, others say no. Some argue that Saakashvili’s government concentrated much more power in the hands of the president, than Shevarnadze could have dreamed about. As a result of the revolution, many NGO activists went into government, and as a result, the NGO sector, which used to be a counter-balance vis-à-vis the president’s authority during Shevarnadze’s times, was weakened. The freedom of mass media, as, at least some observers argue, declined during Saakashvili’s reign. And Saakashvili’s government dealt much more harshly with protests and demonstrations than Shevarnadze’s government.

All this could have been dismissed as “Russian propaganda” some time ago, but as the latest political crisis in Georgia revealed, these concerns were absolutely legitimate. I am not going to diverge into discussing the latest Georgian elections and everything that accompanied them, but certainly it is clear that calling today’s Georgia’s political system “democratic” would be a gross exaggeration. Of course, there’s a chance that as a result of confrontation between opposition and government, the situation may improve, and there are signs of that, but we shall get back to this another time.

So, let’s look at what is happening in Armenia. Apparently, we did not have a change of government. Levon Ter-Petrossian and his team failed to come to power. Of course, some argue that Serj Sarkissian represents a new political force and there actually has been “a transition of power”. This might seem true. But, if we consider some facts, it is clear that this is not so. Serge Sarkissian has been a key figure in the Armenian ruling regime for almost 10 years, at certain times, almost as important as Robert Kotcharian himself. The Rupublican party, has had a majority in the parliament and had been the ruling party since 1999. As for the parties of the ruling coalition, the Dashnakcutyun and Orinats Yerkir have been members of the ruling coalition since 2003 (Orinats Yerkir with a short break from May 2006 to March 2008), and everyone knows that Bargavatch Hayastan was a Kotcharian’s project. Since April 2007, Serj Sarkissian was a prime-minister, backed up with a strong parliamentary majority, under a constitution that shifted a lot of power from the president to the prime-minister. The new prime-minister is also hardly a new figure. He was the head of the Central Bank since 1998 and, as one of the best professionals in the government, obviously played a great role in working out economic policies, at least for several years, given the fact that neither Andranik Markarian nor Serj Sarkissian were particularly well-equipped to solve purely economic issues. Given all this, it is clear that even though Serzh Sarkissian is doing everything he can to present himself as “the new kid on the block”, there are good reasons for scepticism.

So, the ruling regime has not changed. In this sense the opposition leaders have failed. But does this mean that the political system will stay the same? Or in other words, does this mean that “the Armenian revolution” failed. Not necessarily. I believe that in the months to come we will be witnessing dramatic changes in terms of political system. It is hard to say whether these changes will also be accompanied by personal changes in the government. May be yes, maybe not. However, even if Serzh Sarkissian and members of his team retain their positions of authority, the political system, in which they operated during the previous decade, might change dramatically.

Actually, it has already begun to change. One of the main characteristics of the political system under Kotcharian was absence of a real opposition, which reduced the political life of Armenia to an imitation of the political process. And I am not talking only about the Geghamian phenomenon. By “real opposition” I mean an organized political force, which not only opposes the current government, but is also ready to assume the responsibility for government of the country. For almost a decade, there have been no leaders or organizations in Armenia, which were ready to assume the responsibility for running the countries. None of the opposition parties or coalitions had the resources, either psychological, intellectual, or institutional, for taking on the government of the country in case the ruling government was defeated in the elections. Some of the opposition leaders might have entered secret agreements with the government (I am not pointing fingers, Mr Geghamian). Others might have been sincere in their  criticism, but they had neither clear programs nor the resources and capabilities for actually taking on the government and running the country (nothing personal, Mr. Demirchian). When Ter-Petrossian returned into politics in autumn 2007, everyone understood that for the first time in a long time Armenians would face a real choice. May be a choice “between two evils”, but a choice. During the election campaign months a strong political force emerged, which was ready to challenge the existing authorities. As controversial for the majority of Armenians, as they were, Ter-Petrossian and his supporters represented a force, which had both the willingness and the resources to assume the responsibility for running the country. The time, when political life in Armenia was a mere imitation of a political process, was over. Now it was becoming real.

After the February 19^th elections, the March 1 events and the developments that followed, it became painfully real. Protest dispersal, arrests, media restrictions and bans on manifestations were supposed to break up the opposition. The plan was that under this pressure the unlikely alliance of different political forces, which united around Ter-Petrossian, would fall into pieces. The repressions did the opposite: what does not kill you, makes you stronger. The opposition emerged weakened by the arrests, but more consolidated and more determined. The post-emergency protests like the March 21^st “march of silence” showed that there is still a portion of population that is still willing to take to the streets. The post-March 21 protests, though small in scale, showed that the opposition was able to recruit support from a group that previously showed little interest in politics – students and young professionals. The tragedy of March 1, as well as the clumsy methods of the police dealing with the following protests, only alienated people who did not have a particular sympathy for any of the camps. Even those, who never forgave Ter-Petrossian for his misdeeds in the 1990s, and did not agree with his rhetoric of demonization of “Karabakh clan”, do not approve of the methods of the current government. Ruben Hakhvardyan summed up this mood when he said that to him “the government has died on March 1”.

So, we have a situation, which is completely different from what had existed during Robert Kotcharyan’s presidency. We have a government which has never been as weak as it is now (probably, except for the aftermath of October 27,1999), and opposition, which has never been as strong as it is now. Of course the opposition is not strong enough to overthrow the government, but the government is not strong enough to crush the opposition either.

Another element of the Armenian political system during the previous decade – the “quasi-opposition” vanished in the post-election turmoil. As a result of the post-elections developments, most quasi- or semi-opposition leaders were either completely marginalized or joined the government. It is clear that today in Armenia there is no other major opposition force than the one, which was formed around Ter-Petrossian during the elections.

Another thing, which shows that there can be no return to “ancient regime” or “stability a la Kotcharyan”, is the communication technologies development. When A1plus was shut down years ago, there were very few alternatives to conventional mass media, such as TV. The only wireless telephone company that existed then did not provide even text messaging services to some of its customers, the number of internet users was minuscule,most Armenians have never seen a DVD-disc in their lives, and “You tube” didn’t exist. Today, and to be fair, in part we have to be grateful for that to Kotcharian’s government, situation is different. The recent events showed that the development of communication technologies in Armenia, albeit far behind global standards, is already gone too far: the government is not able to control the flows of information any more. Soviet methods like censoring TV stations and newspapers are not exactly effective in a post-modern digital world, with Internet, mobile phones, digital cameras and DVD-Rs.

All these factors have produced a completely different situation in Armenia, than existed five years ago. It is dramatically different even if compared to the situation that emerged after May 2007 elections. Will this situational change lead to systemic changes? So, as we can see, the political system has already begun to change. This change has been rapid and dramatic. It has not been a result of a planned reform, but rather an outcome of mass protests. In this sense we are witnessing a revolution, even though the personalities in the government have not been changed.

 As the history of revolutions suggests, there are two possible ways of development of the situation. Like Russia in 1905, Armenia and its rulers are faced with two alternatives. One is that the changes will continue, leading to a complete transformation of the political system, whether the government wants that or not. If this trend wins, Armenia eventually might be able to come to a more or less functioning democratic political system, and in that case it will not really matter who stays in power and for how long. In fact, such a change will be more profound and sustainable, than the one which includes a change of government, without change of the institutions.

The other possible development is what we can call “reaction” or “counter-revolution” – an attempt of returning to the pre-October 2007 situation. This can be achieved only through violence: continued crackdown against opposition activists, violent suppression of all forms of protest, persecution of any form of descent, suspending media freedom, which will include internet censorship. This might help to get rid of the danger that opposition poses to the government for some time, but the long-term consequences will be tragic for Armenia, and eventually for the ruling elite itself.

In early 20^th century Russia, the tzarist regime after some experiments with limited democracy, chose the second option. We all know the consequences. Let us hope Armenia’s future is brighter.